This paper defends the idea that there might be vagueness or indeterminacy in the world itself--as opposed to merely in our representations of the world--against the charges of incoherence and unintelligibility. First we consider the idea that the world might contain vague properties and relations ; we show that this idea is already implied by certain well-understood views concerning the semantics of vague predicates (most notably the fuzzy view). Next we consider the idea that the world might contain vague objects (...) ; we argue that an object is indeterminate in a certain respect (colour, size, etc.) just in case it is a borderline case of a maximally specific colour (size, etc.) property. Finally we consider the idea that the world as a whole might be indeterminate; we argue that the world is indeterminate just in case it lacks a determinate division into determinate objects. (shrink)

Logic is essential to correct reasoning and also has important theoretical applications in philosophy, computer science, linguistics, and mathematics. This book provides an exceptionally clear introduction to classical logic, with a unique approach that emphasizes both the hows and whys of logic. Here Nicholas Smith thoroughly covers the formal tools and techniques of logic while also imparting a deeper understanding of their underlying rationales and broader philosophical significance. In addition, this is the only introduction to logic available today that (...) presents all the major forms of proof--trees, natural deduction in all its major variants, axiomatic proofs, and sequent calculus. The book also features numerous exercises, with solutions available on an accompanying website. -/- Logic is the ideal textbook for undergraduates and graduate students seeking a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the subject. -/- Provides an essential introduction to classical logic Emphasizes the how and why of logic Covers both formal and philosophical issues Presents all the major forms of proof--from trees to sequent calculus Features numerous exercises, with solutions available online The ideal textbook for undergraduates and graduate students . (shrink)

This paper argues that the most famous objection to backward time travel can carry no weight. In its classic form, the objection is that backward time travel entails the occurrence of impossible things, such as auto-infanticide—and hence is itself impossible. David Lewis has rebutted the classic version of the objection: auto-infanticide is prevented by coincidences, such as time travellers slipping on banana peels as they attempt to murder their younger selves. I focus on Paul Horwich‘s more recent version of the (...) objection, according to which backward time travel entails not impossible things, but improbable ones—such as the string of slips on banana peels that would be required to stop a determined auto-infanticidal maniac from murdering her younger self—and hence is itself highly improbable. I argue that backward time travel does not entail unusual numbers of coincidences; and that, even if it did, that would not render its occurrence unlikely. (shrink)

In VAGUENESS AND DEGREES OF TRUTH, Nicholas Smith develops a new theory of vagueness: fuzzy plurivaluationism. -/- A predicate is said to be VAGUE if there is no sharply defined boundary between the things to which it applies and the things to which it does not apply. For example, 'heavy' is vague in a way that 'weighs over 20 kilograms' is not. A great many predicates -- both in everyday talk, and in a wide array of theoretical vocabularies, from (...) law to psychology to engineering -- are vague. -/- Smith argues, based on a detailed account of the defining features of vagueness, that an accurate theory of vagueness must involve the idea that truth comes in degrees. The core idea of degrees of truth is that while some sentences are true and some are false, others possess intermediate truth values: they are truer than the false sentences, but not as true as the true ones. Degree-theoretic treatments of vagueness have been proposed in the past, but all have encountered significant objections. In light of these, Smith develops a new type of degree theory. Its innovations include a definition of logical consequence that allows the derivation of a classical consequence relation from the degree-theoretic semantics, a unified account of degrees of belief and their relationships with degrees of truth and subjective probabilities, and the incorporation of semantic indeterminacy -- the view that vague statements need not have unique meanings -- into the degree-theoretic framework. -/- As well as being essential reading for those working on vagueness, Smith's book provides an excellent entry-point for newcomers to the area -- both from elsewhere in philosophy, and from computer science, logic and engineering. It contains a thorough introduction to existing theories of vagueness and to the requisite logical background. (shrink)

Postmodernism and poststructuralism challenge fundamental positions in social theory. This book sets out some of the components of a postmodern social theory of health and healing, deriving from theorists including Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Cixous and Kristeva. Nicholas J. Fox observes that the knowledge of the medical profession about the body, illness and health supplies the basis for medical dominance. The body of the patient is inscribed by discourses of professional `care,' an interaction which subjectifies the patient. Fox (...) explores the character of this power - and how it may be, and is, resisted. The book illustrates with detailed examples how the organization of health care and the caring relationship itself are sites for this contestation of power. Elements of feminist theory, and Derridean concepts of diffrance and intertextuality, supply the framework for the politics and ethics of the postmodern position on health. Deleuze and Guattari's radical challenge to psychoanalysis and familial repetitions within the healer/patient contact allows a re-reading of central ideas in medical sociology. While focusing upon the possibilities of postmodern social theory, the book demands a reappraisal of issues of structure, identity and knowledge in modernist medical sociology. Modernist sociology, Fox suggests, has been complicit in the creation of `the patient,' and of 'health' and 'illness.' Written with an emphasis on accessibility, this book explores the practical consequences of postmodern theory as well as familiarizing the reader with the concepts of postmodernism. (shrink)

Life works best when people value us for more than our looks. In these pages, Model and a philosopher friend reflect on the subtleties of life, revealing insights and finding ways to develop deeper, more meaningful ties with our own inner self and the other people in our lives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Eucharistic Form of God: Trinity, Incarnation, and Sacrament in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar by Jonathan Martin CirauloNicholas J. HealyThe Eucharistic Form of God: Trinity, Incarnation, and Sacrament in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. By Jonathan Martin Ciraulo. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022. Pp. xiii + 297. $50.00 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-0-268-20223-1.In Fides et Ratio 93, under the heading “current (...) tasks for theology,” John Paul II writes:The chief purpose of theology is to provide an understanding of Revelation and the content of faith. The very heart of theological enquiry will thus be the contemplation of the mystery of the Triune God. The approach to this mystery begins with reflection upon the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God: his coming as man, his going to his Passion and Death.... From this vantage-point, the prime commitment of theology is seen to be the understanding of God’s kenosis, a grand and mysterious truth for the human mind, which finds it inconceivable that suffering and death can express a love which gives itself and seeks nothing in return. In this light, a careful analysis of texts emerges as a basic and urgent need: first the texts of Scripture, and then those which express the Church’s living Tradition. On this score, some problems have emerged in recent times, problems which are only partially new; and a coherent solution to them will not be found without philosophy’s contribution.These words about the mystery of Jesus Christ’s life and death as a revelation of the Triune God—and about the emergence of new difficulties and questions—underscore the importance of a dialogue between St. Thomas Aquinas and the great twentieth-century theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. As two recent books written from a Thomistic perspective have shown (Aidan Nicholas, Balthasar for Thomists [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2020]); [End Page 715] Matthew Levering, The Achievement of Hans Urs von Balthasar [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019]), Balthasar’s profound indebtedness to the metaphysics of Aquinas provides a solid foundation for dialogue. And yet a number of difficulties remain. What is the relationship between the so-called real distinction of esse and essence and the hypostatic union of two natures in the person of the Son? How and in what sense does the paschal mystery of Jesus’s death and Resurrection presuppose and express the mystery of the Father’s eternal generation of the Son? In the words of Joseph Ratzinger, “in the pierced heart of the Crucified, God’s own heart is opened up—here we see who God is and what he is like” (Spirit of the Liturgy [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000], 48). How does the mystery of Christ’s Eucharist reveal the heart of God?This last question about the Eucharist and the nature of God is explored in depth in Jonathan Martin Ciraulo’s monograph, The Eucharistic Form of God: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Sacramental Theology. Despite the expansive title, the primary aim of this book is fairly straightforward: to present Balthasar’s theology of the Eucharist and to show the significance of his thought for contemporary sacramental theology. Anyone who seeks to offer a systematic account of Balthasar’s theology of the Eucharist is confronted with at least two basic obstacles or challenges. First, his reflections on the Eucharist are scattered throughout (and often hidden within) an immense and complex corpus of writings. Second, the most distinctive feature of Balthasar’s theology of the Eucharist is the inseparability of his sacramental theology from his speculative account of the central mysteries of the Christian faith—Trinity, Incarnation, Cross and Resurrection, Church, and eschaton.The Eucharistic Form of God represents a thoughtful, well-written, and original response to this twofold challenge. Regarding the first point: Ciraulo demonstrates an intimate familiarity with the whole of Balthasar’s corpus. He draws together Balthasar’s early writings on German literature, his monographs on Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor, his engagement with Karl Barth, his interpretation of twentieth-century French Catholic literature... (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss one form of the idea that spacetime and gravity might ‘emerge’ from quantum theory, i.e. via a holographic duality, and in particular via AdS/CFT duality. I begin by giving a survey of the general notion of duality, as well as its connection to emergence. I then review the AdS/CFT duality and proceed to discuss emergence in this context. We will see that it is difficult to find compelling arguments for the emergence of full quantum gravity (...) from gauge theory via AdS/CFT, i.e. for the boundary theory's being metaphysically more fundamental than the bulk theory. (shrink)

This paper presents a new solution to the problems for orthodox decision theory posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives. I argue that a key question raised by consideration of these gambles is whether evaluative compositionality (as I term it) is a requirement of rationality: is the value that an ideally rational agent places on a gamble determined by the values that she places on its possible outcomes, together with their mode of composition into the gamble (i.e. the probabilities (...) assigned to them)? The paper first outlines a certain simple response to the Pasadena game and identifies two problems with this response, the second of which is that it leads to a wholesale violation of evaluative compositionality. I then argue that rationality does not require decision makers to factor in outcomes of arbitrarily low probability. A method for making decisions which flows from this basic idea is then developed, and it is shown that this decision method (Truncation) leads to a limited — as opposed to wholesale — violation of evaluative compositionality. The paper then argues that the truncation method yields solutions to the problems posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives that are both attractive in themselves and superior to those yielded by alternative proposals in the literature. (shrink)

Orthodoxy has it that mereological composition can never be a vague matter, for if it were, then existence would sometimes be a vague matter too, and that's impossible. I accept that vague composition implies vague existence, but deny that either is impossible. In this paper I develop degree-theoretic versions of quantified modal logic and of mereology, and combine them in a framework that allows us to make clear sense of vague composition and vague existence, and the relationships between them.

In this superb introduction, Nicholas Dent covers the whole of Rousseau's thought. Beginning with a helpful overview of Rousseau's life and works, he introduces and assesses Rousseau's central ideas and arguments. These include the corruption of modern civilization, the state of nature, his famous theories of _amour de soi _and _amour propre_, education, and his famous work _Emile_. He gives particular attention to Rousseau's theories of democracy and freedom found in his most celebrated work, _The Social Contract_, and explains (...) what Rousseau meant by the 'general will'. (shrink)

This article investigates and resolves the question whether gauge symmetry can display analogs of the famous Galileo’s ship scenario. In doing so, it builds on and clarifies the work of Greaves and Wallace on this subject.

This article uncovers a foundational relationship between the ‘gauge symmetry’ of a Newton-Cartan theory and the celebrated Trautman Recovery Theorem and explores its implications for recent philosophical work on Newton-Cartan gravitation.

This paper presents and defends a definition of vagueness, compares it favourably with alternative definitions, and draws out some consequences of accepting this definition for the project of offering a substantive theory of vagueness. The definition is roughly this: a predicate 'F' is vague just in case for any objects a and b, if a and b are very close in respects relevant to the possession of F, then 'Fa' and 'Fb' are very close in respect of truth. The definition (...) is extended to cover vagueness of many-place predicates, of properties and relations, and of objects. Some of the most important advantages of the definition are that it captures the intuitions which motivate the thought that vague predicates are tolerant, without leading to contradiction, and that it yields a clear understanding of the relationships between higher-order vagueness, sorites susceptibility, blurred boundaries, and borderline cases. The most notable consequence of the definition is that the correct theory of vagueness must countenance degrees of truth. (shrink)

As a prolegomenon to understanding the sense in which dualities are theoretical equivalences, we investigate the intuitive `equivalence' of hyper-regular Lagrangian and Hamiltonian classical mechanics. We show that the symplectification of these theories provides a sense in which they are isomorphic, and mutually and canonically definable through an analog of `common definitional extension'.

This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken (...) to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less. (shrink)

Graham Priest (1994) has argued that the following paradoxes all have the same structure: Russell’s Paradox, Burali-Forti’s Paradox, Mirimanoff’s Paradox, König’s Paradox, Berry’s Paradox, Richard’s Paradox, the Liar and Liar Chain Paradoxes, the Knower and Knower Chain Paradoxes, and the Heterological Paradox. Their common structure is given by Russell’s Schema: there is a property φ and function δ such that..

A philosophical treatment of ideas, the book presents a philosophical dialogue much in the spirit of classical philosophical dialogues, notably those of Plato and Xenophon. As those authors do in a number of their works, Nick Pappas adopts a light and playful tone to treat a serious topic. This contrast helps bring out the truth, in an approachable style that requires no prior exposure to philosophy and heavy intellectual work.

In this paper I present a new argument against vague identity — one that is more fundamental than existing arguments — and I also try to explain why we find the idea of vague identity puzzling, in a way that will dispel the puzzlement. In brief, my argument is this: to make clear sense of something, one must at least model it set-theoretically; but due to the special place of identity in set-theoretic models, any vague relation that one does model (...) set-theoretically will not be identity, for real identity will already be there, built into the background of the model, and perfectly precise. (shrink)

It's Game Time!: Games to Enhance Classroom Learning enables the teacher to decide when and how to use games to effectively complement their teaching philosophy and style to meet the needs of their students by providing over 40 games that can be used in any class at any level.

The received model of degrees of belief represents them as probabilities. Over the last half century, many philosophers have been convinced that this model fails because it cannot make room for the idea that an agent’s degrees of belief should respect the available evidence. In its place they have advocated a model that represents degrees of belief using imprecise probabilities (sets of probability functions). This paper presents a model of degrees of belief based on Dempster–Shafer belief functions and then presents (...) arguments for belief functions over imprecise probabilities as a model of evidence-respecting degrees of belief. The arguments cover three kinds of issue: theoretical virtues (simplicity, interpretability and flexibility); motivations; and problem cases (dilation and belief inertia). (shrink)

There is an extensive literature on time travel in both philosophy and physics. Part of the great interest of the topic stems from the fact that reasons have been given both for thinking that time travel is physically possible—and for thinking that it is logically impossible! This entry deals primarily with philosophical issues; issues related to the physics of time travel are covered in the separate entries on time travel and modern physics and time machines. We begin with the definitional (...) question: what is time travel? We then turn to the major objection to the possibility of backwards time travel: the Grandfather paradox. Next, issues concerning causation are discussed—and then, issues in the metaphysics of time and change. We end with a discussion of the question why, if backwards time travel will ever occur, we have not been visited by time travellers from the future. (shrink)

This paper presents a new theory of vagueness, which is designed to retain the virtues of the fuzzy theory, while avoiding the problem of higher-order vagueness. The theory presented here accommodates the idea that for any statement S₁ to the effect that 'Bob is bald' is x true, for x in [0, 1], there should be a further statement S₂ which tells us how true S₁ is, and so on - that is, it accommodates higher-order vagueness without resorting to the (...) claim that the metalanguage in which the semantics of vagueness is presented is itself vague, and without requiring us to abandon the idea that the logic - as opposed to the semantics - of vague discourse is classical. I model the extension of a vague predicate P as a blurry set, this being a function which assigns a degree of membership or degree function to each object o, where a degree function in turn assigns an element of [0, 1] to each finite sequence of elements of [0, 1]. The idea is that the assignment to the sequence (0.3, 0.2), for example, represents the degree to which it is true to say that it is 0.2 true that o is P to degree 0.3. The philosophical merits of my theory are discussed in detail, and the theory is compared with other extensions and generalisations of fuzzy logic in the literature. (shrink)

The “justice of markets” is intricately connected to the treatment of the poor and the disadvantaged in market economies. The increased interest of multinational corporations in low-income market segments affords, on one hand, the opportunity for a more inclusive capitalism, and on the other, the threat of greater exploitation of poor and disadvantaged consumers. This article traces the contributions of Catholic Social Teaching and its basic principles toward providing insight into what constitutes “justice” in such “marketing to the impoverished” situations.

In his celebrated article on the contrary-to-fact conditional Roderick Chisholm makes the following astute observation.

This paper brings to light a new puzzle for Frege interpretation, and offers a solution to that puzzle. The puzzle concerns Frege’s judgement-stroke (‘|’), and consists in a tension between three of Frege’s claims. First, Frege vehemently maintains that psychological considerations should have no place in logic. Second, Frege regards the judgementstroke—and the associated dissociation of assertoric force from content, of the act of judgement from the subject matter about which judgement is made—as a crucial part of his logic. Third, (...) Frege holds that judging is an inner mental process, and that the distinction marked by the judgement-stroke, between entertaining a thought and judging that it is true, is a psychological distinction. I argue that what initially looks like confusion here on Frege’s part appears quite reasonable when we remind ourselves of the differences between Frege’s conception of logic and our own. (shrink)

One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted , that is, which are being used to express judgements . There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role of the (...) judgement stroke in a way that renders it readily comprehensible why Frege insisted that this symbol was an essential part of his logical system. The key point here is that Frege viewed logic as the study of inference relations amongst acts of judgement , rather than – as in the typical contemporary view – of consequence relations amongst certain objects (propositions or well-formed formulae). The paper also explains why Frege's use of the judgement stroke is not in conflict with his avowed anti-psychologism, and why Wittgenstein's criticism of the judgement stroke as 'logically quite meaningless' is unfounded. The key point here is that while the judgement stroke has no content , its use in logic and mathematics is subject to a very stringent norm of assertion. (shrink)

A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief: the kind arising from vagueness, and the familiar kind arising from uncertainty, which obey the laws of probability? I argue that we cannot coherently countenance two different kinds of degree of belief. Instead, I present a framework in which there is a single notion of degree (...) of belief, which in certain circumstances behaves like a subjective probability assignment and in other circumstances does not. The core idea is that one’s degree of belief in a proposition P is one’s expectation of P’s degree of truth. (shrink)

Beyond Health applies post-structuralist and postmodern ideas to issues of health and health care to provide a radical re-think of how health is to be understood. It offers a perspective in which health is seen as an affirmation of potential rather than as a narrow biopsychosocial construct. The author develops his notion of arche-health and in so doing provides a lucid account of a wide range of post-structuralist and postmodern theoretical perspectives and their relevance to the field of health. This (...) text explains complex ideas so even a reader with no previous background in the topic can grasp it. In each chapter the author explains and applies a selection of theoretical perspectives. (shrink)

This paper addresses a worry about backwards time travel. The worry is that there is something mysteriously inexplicable about the combination of commonplace events that will inevitably conspire to prevent the time traveler from doing something impossible such as killing her younger self. The worry is first distinguished from other problems for backwards time travel concerning its alleged impossibility or improbability. It is then shown that the worry is misplaced: there is in fact no real problem here. Yet the worry (...) has been widely expressed—so a suggestion is also made as to why it is so easy to get into the position of thinking that there is a genuine problem here, when in fact there is not. Finally, in light of the resolution of the inexplicability worry, a new way of dealing with the other two problems for backwards time travel—concerning its alleged impossibility and improbability—is proposed. (shrink)

Exploring the underlying properties of social interaction viewed from across many disciplines, this work examines their origin in infant development and in human evolution.

Philosophers of physics and physicists have long been intrigued by the analogies and disanalogies between gravitational theories and gauge theories. Indeed, repeated attempts to collapse these disanalogies have made us acutely aware that there are fairly general obstacles to doing so. Nonetheless, there is a special case space-time dimensions) in which gravity is often claimed to be identical to a gauge theory. I subject this claim to philosophical scrutiny in this article. In particular, I analyse how the standard disanalogies can (...) be overcome in dimensions, and consider whether really licenses the interpretation of gravity as a gauge theory. Our conceptual analysis reveals more subtle disanalogies between gravity and gauge, and connects these to interpretive issues in classical and quantum gravity. 1 Introduction1.1 Motivation1.2 Prospectus2 Disanalogies3 Three-dimensional gravity and gauge3.1 gravity3.2 Chern–Simons3.2.1 Cartan geometry3.2.2 Overcoming obst-gauge via Cartan connections3.3 Disanalogies collapsed4 Two More Disanalogies4.1 What about the symmetries?4.2 The phase spaces of the two theories5 Summary and Conclusion. (shrink)

I have argued for a picture of decision theory centred on the principle of Rationally Negligible Probabilities. Isaacs argues against this picture on the grounds that it has an untenable implication. I first examine whether my view really has this implication; this involves a discussion of the legitimacy or otherwise of infinite decisions. I then examine whether the implication is really undesirable and conclude that it is not.

Rovelli’s “Why Gauge?” offers a parable to show that gauge-dependent quantities have a modal and relational physical significance. We subject the morals of this parable to philosophical scrutiny and argue that, while Rovelli’s main point stands, there are important disanalogies between his parable and Yang-Mills type gauge theory.

In this paper I present a new theory of propositions, according to which propositions are abstract mathematical objects: well-formed formulas together with models. I distinguish the theory from a number of existing views and explain some of its advantages  chief amongst which are the following. On this view, propositions are unified and intrinsically truth-bearing. They are mind- and language-independent and they are governed by logic. The theory of propositions is ontologically innocent. It makes room for an appropriate interface with (...) formal semantics and it does not enforce an overly fine or overly coarse level of granularity. (shrink)